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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract dispute involving a written contract that was signed 
by Ronald J. He!!er and David J. Desmond in their capacities as the President and Chief 
Operating Officer (respectively) of Peritus I Asset Management, LLC (hereinafter 
referred to as "Peritus"). They also signed in their capacity as Directors of American 
Medical File (hereinafter referred to as "AMF"). The contract is dated August 10, 2011, 
and was attached to both the initial complaint (R. 000009 - 20) and the proposed 
Amended Complaint (R. 000334 - 000351 ). 
Peritus raised the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds. Interestingly, 
Peritus has taken the inconsistent positon that Peritus was a guarantor but that the 
written contract was not specific enough to be enforceable as a guarantee. 
Bailey contends the contract created a surety relationship instead of a guaranty 
and that Peritus is an original promisor. Therefore, the Statute of Frauds does not apply 
to this contract dispute. Peritus verbally and in writing agreed to be a joint obligor with 
AMF as evidenced by the signatures of Heller and Desmond in their capacities for both 
AMF and Peritus. The determination of whether the arrangement created a "surety" or 
"guaranty" relationship is dependent on objective criteria. The objective criteria proves 
this was a surety relationship. 
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B. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Peritus is an investment advisory company that is paid a fee for investment advice 
and for managing its clients' investments. In 2004 Peritus created the PGO Fund and 
invested $6.45 million of its clients' money in AMF. The PGO Fund also provided AMF 
with a bridge loan. After AMF defaulted on the bridge loan the PGO Fund foreclosed 
and became the majority owner of AMF in 2006. (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 2 - 3.) 
On about March 10, 2006, Ronald J. Heller and David J. Desmond acting in their 
capacities as officers of Peritus and the PGO fund agreed to hire Bailey as a Vice 
President of AMF (R. 000348-49). Between 2008 and 2011 Peritus provided loans to 
AMF in the amount of approximately $800,000.00 (Respondent's Brief, p. 4). Heller and 
Desmond each hold 1,500,000 shares of AMF stock. (Respondent's Brief, p. 5.) The 
fact Peritus was continuously funding AMF is objective evidence of a surety relationship. 
The fact Peritus was motivated to benefit Peritus is evidence of a surety relationship. 
By late July or early August 2011 Bailey was owed $95,000.00 in back pay and 
therefore quit. Peritus officers Heller and Desmond contacted Bailey and requested he 
return to work. Bailey told them he would not return to work until he received a written 
contract signed by Peritus in which Peritus was obligated to fund Bailey's salary at AMF. 
In response to that demand Bailey was provided a written contract which is signed by 
Heller and Desmond in their capacities as officers of Peritus. Baiiey contends the 
contract was written by Heller and Desmond and therefore must be interpreted in 
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Bailey's favor in the event of ambiguity. The fact there was one contract signed by both 
AMF and Peritus is objective proof of a surety relationship. 
The written contract does not mention the $95,000.00 in back pay but it does 
provide for a salary of $150,000.00 per year as the Chief Technology Officer of AMF 
and a severance package equal to PNO (2) years annual base salar/. Bailey contends 
AMF/Peritus breached the contract by failing to pay his salary after January 1, 2012. 
Bailey claims salary damages of $40,119.05 plus severance benefits of $300,000.00 
pursuant to the written contract signed by Desmond and Heller for Peritus and AMF (R. 
000312-313.) 
C. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Peritus moved for summary judgment on the grounds Peritus was a "guarantor" 
and that the written contract did not contain guarantee language sufficient to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds. Bailey responded and filed a motion to amend his complaint to clarify 
the claim that the promise of Peritus is an "original promise" per I.C. § 9-506(2). 
Therefore the Statute of Frauds does not apply. (See R. 000353.) 
The District Court granted Peritus summary judgment "based on the Statute of 
Frauds." (R. 000388) The District Court denied the motion to amend on the basis "the 
amendment would be futile" and on the basis "the proposed Amended Complaint does 
not even allege facts that would support a theory that AMF somehow became Peritus' 
surety, as required to fit within [the] exception to the Statute of Frauds set forth in I.C. § 
9-506(2). (R. 000401.) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 3 
The proposed Amended Complaint contained the following factual and legal 
allegations. 
29. On or about August 10, 2011, Ron Heller and Dave 
Desmond prepared a written employment agreement which they signed in 
their capacity as officers of Peritus and Directors of AMF. Bailey signed 
the agreement and accepted the terms of the written contract along with 
the terms of the oral agreement set forth in Count One. 
30. The written agreement is binding and enforceable against 
Peritus and it is not barred by the Statute of Frauds for numerous reasons. 
First, the agreement fully states in writing both Bailey's rights to payment 
of $150,000.00 per year salary, benefits and 1,500,000 shares of AMF 
stock along with severance benefits of $300,000.00. The contract sets 
forth Bailey's obligations fully. The agreement is signed by the parties to 
be charged, Peritus and AMF. 
31. The written and contemporaneous oral agreements are not 
barred by the Statute of Frauds due to I.C. § 9-506(2). Given AMF's lack 
of revenues, Peritus agreed to be the primary obliger to provide capital to 
AMF to pay Bailey's salary and benefits including severance pay. Peritus 
had in the course of Bailey's employment since April 1, 2006, been the 
primary source of Bailey's compensation. Given the course of the 
dealings between Peritus and Bailey, the fact Peritus employees drafted 
the written contract and signed it, the only reasonable interpretation of the 
contract is that Peritus agreed to be the primary obliger to Bailey after 
August 2011. Peritus agreed to be responsible for Bailey's compensation 
because Peritus believed Bailey's serves were necessary to make AMF 
profitable. Peritus expected to receive financial benefits from AMF 
including repayment of at least $8,000,000.00 in loans, increased stock 
values for Peritus and its clients, as well as valuable stock owned by 
Peritus members. 
32. Lastly, Bailey specifically advised Peritus representatives 
Desmond and Heller he would not return to work unless Peritus provided 
Bailey a written contract of employment whereby Peritus was obligated to 
Bailey for his compensation. Peritus drafted the contract which Bailey 
relied upon and therefore Peritus is estopped from claiming it is not bound 
by the contract Peritus drafted. 
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33. Between January 2, 2012, and March 15, 2013, Peritus 
failed to fund AMF with sufficient capital to pay Bailey his twice monthly 
paychecks. As of March 15, 2013, payments totaling $40,119.05 were 
owed to Bailey. Peritus failed and refused to pay Bailey under the written 
contract as promised and therefore breached the contract. Given the 
substantial and material breach of contract, Bailey was relieved of his duty 
to perform under the contract including the duty to work or give notice of 
termination. 
34. Bailey is entitled to damages of $40,119.05 in back pay 
earned after August 10, 2011, severance benefits of $300,000.00 and 
interest at the legal rate from the date due pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104. 
35. Bailey is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
I.C. § 12-120 in an amount to be determined by the Court but not less than 
$113,000.00. 




The initial complaint accurately reflected an extremely confusing factual scenario. 
The confusion stems from a revolving door of changing characters, evolving contracts, 
and key players serving in multiple capacities. As an example, Ron Heller's name 
appears on the initial Contract of Employment dated March 10, 2006, only in his 
capacities as the President of Peritus I Asset Management, LLC and as Managing 
Director of Peritus Global Opportunity Fund, LP. There were no signature lines for 
American Medical File. (R. 000351). As a precaution, Ron Heller was named in the 
complaint individually along with Peritus and American Medical File to cover the 
possibility Peritus or AMF asserted the defense that Heller did not have authority to 
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enter into the contract. In that event, Heller would indeed be individually liable. 
However, neither AMF nor Peritus has asserted that defense and it is waived. Many 
other potential claims have not been pursued in light of facts discovered after filing the 
lawsuit or facts that occurred after filing the lawsuit. For instance, AMF filed bankruptcy 
after the complaint was filed and has been·discharged. Consequently, Bailey's theories 
and factual allegations have necessarily changed. What has not changed is that Bailey 
still asserts Peritus is liable for breach of the contract which is attached to both the initial 
complaint and the Amended Complaint and is signed by two Peritus officers, the 
President and Chief Operating Officer. 
B. PERITUS IS ATTEMPTING TO CONFUSE THE COURT REGARDING 
BAILEY'S RELIANCE ON I.C. § 9-506 
Peritus continues to make arguments assuming Bailey contends Peritus was a 
guarantor. This attempt to confuse the issues is disingenuous. Peritus is directed to 
Appellant's Brief, page 1. Bailey has at all times relied on I.C. § 9-506 - Original 
Obligation exception. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract dispute primarily concerning the 
interpretation of the Statute of Frauds original obligation exception Idaho 
Code § 9-506(2) and the "Main Purpose Rule." Bailey contends the trial 
court erred when it found as a matter of law that the contractual 
arrangement was intended to be a guaranty. Bailey contends AMF and 
Peritus were joint debtors in a surety relationship. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 1. (Emphasis added.) 
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Appellant's brief is extremely clear that Bailey is relying on the Original Obligation 
Rule set forth in LC. § 9-506(2). See Heading C. I.C. § 9-506(2) Exception Applies. 
Appellant Brief, p. 18. See also lengthy discussion pages 20 - 26 under part C. 1. The 
Difference Between Surety and Guarantor. See also Bailey's Brief in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment. (R. 000281-284.) 
Peritus wastes numerous pages in its brief pointing out that a guaranty and 
surety are mutually exclusive. What Peritus fails to acknowledge is that the agreement 
in Mickelsen Construction did in fact involve a guaranty as illustrated in the chart set 
forth in the next section of this brief. This Court's statement that: "An allegation of an 
agreement to guaranty a debt and an allegation of an agreement under section 9-506(2) 
are mutually exclusive" is correct. Bailey could but does not take inconsistent positions. 
The Court's statement: "A person cannot be both the principal debtor and the 
guarantor" is still also true. (See Mickelsen Construction v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 
299 P.3d 203 at 210 - 11.) The objective criteria prove this was a surety relationship, 
not a guaranty. 
C. PERITUS AGREED TO ANSWER FOR THE OBLIGATION OF AMF 
Bailey agrees that Peritus was not a "guarantor" as that term is strictly interpreted 
and intended by the Idaho legislature. Bailey concedes the shareholders of AMF and 
creditors of AMF are not liable to Bailey as a result of those relationships. Bailey 
adamantly denies that only AMF is liable to Bailey as a result of his employment for 
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AMF. The contract at issue sits squarely within the Original Obligation exception set 
the Idaho legislature as an exception to the Statute of Frauds. 
l.C. § 9-506 Original obligations - Writing not needed. - A promise to 
answer for the obligation of another, in any of the following cases, is 
deemed an original obligation of the promiser, and need not be in writing: 
2. Where the creditor parts with va!ue, or enters into an 
obligation, in consideration of the obligations in respect to which the 
promise is made, in terms or under circumstances such as to render the 
party making the promise the principal debtor, and the person in whose 
behalf it is made, his surety. 
An "Original Obligation" is very similar to a guarantee arrangement which must 
be in writing. In each arrangement there is one creditor and two obligors which are joint 
debtors. This fact is clear from the plain language of the two statutes. 
I.C. § 9 - 505. Certain Agreements to be in writing. -
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage 
of another, except in the cases provided for in section 9 - 506, Idaho 
Code. 
This section recognizes one obliger may agree to pay another obligors debt, as 
long as the agreement is in writing. There is nothing in the language of the statute that 
relieves one of the debtors from their obligation. Obviously, the express terms of a 
contract may substitute one debtor for another. But it is clear, the Statute of Frauds is 
silent in that regard. Further, the requirement for a written agreement has exceptions as 
indicated by the phrase, "except in the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho 
Code." Bailey contends I.C. § 9-506(2) applies. That section provides: 
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LC. § 9-506 Original obligations - Writing not needed. - A promise to 
answer for the obligation of another, in any of the following cases, is 
deemed an original obligation of the promiser, and need not be in writing: 
2. Where the creditor p·arts with value, or enters into an 
obligation, in consideration of the obligations in respect to which the 
promise is made, in terms or under circumstances such as to render the 
party making the promise the principal debtor, and the person in whose 
behalf it is made, his surety. 
The express terms of I.C. § 9-506(2) clearly encompass Bailey's contract with 
AMF and Peritus. Peritus made a promise both orally and in writing "to answer for the 
obligation of another" - AMF. AMF was the employer with the obligation to pay its 
employee, Bailey. Peritus agreed to "answer" for AMF's obligation. Peritus raised 
$6.45 million through the "PGO Fund" which Peritus invested in AMF, a "bridge loan," 
and Peritus itself admits to loaning AMF $800,000.00 between 2008 - 2011. 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 2 - 4). The fact Peritus was continually funding AMF makes 
Peritus a surety, not a guarantor. A guarantor is only called upon to contribute funds 
long after a default has occurred and only if a default has occurred. The timing of the 
funding differentiates a surety from a guarantor. There is a factual dispute over the 
amount Peritus provided to AMF so that AMF could pay its $40,000.00 per month 
overhead, but it is undisputed Peritus or its owners and clients capitalized AMF at all 
times. It was no accident Heller and Desmond signed both of Bailey's contracts. Heller, 
Desmond, and Peritus had a direct financial stake in the success of AMF. The fact 
Peritus was motivated to benefit itself is also a defining characteristic of an Original 
Promise as a surety. 
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When interpreting the legislature's intent as expressed in I.C. § 9-505 and I.C. § 
9 - 506, it should be noted the statutes were originally passed in 1881. The use of 
terminology such as the word "surety" has likely changed. Therefore, it is helpful to 
consider the historical differences between the concepts of "guaranty" and "surety." The 
"Main Purpose Rule" as explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1891 in Davis v. 
Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 12 S. Ct. 58 (1891) and the Restatement of Contracts (Second)§ 
116 (1981) are more authoritative than Corpus Juris Secundum. 
As noted by the 8th Circuit Court, there are distinctions between a guarantor and 
surety when interpreted in a strict sense. The guarantor is "secondary and collateral" 
while a surety is "original, primary, and direct." See Howell v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 69 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1934). (Cited at length in Appellant's Brief.) 
Perhaps the clearest method to illustrate the differences and similarities between 
a guarantor and surety arrangement is to compare and contrast the facts of this case 
which are clearly a "surety" arrangement with the facts of the Mickelsen Construction, 
Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396 (2013) case relied upon by Peritus and which the Idaho 
Supreme Court correctly determined was a "guaranty" arrangement. 




1. Number of Contracts 1 employment contract 
2. Timing of Signatures Same time 
Of Obligors 
3. Signatures on 
Principal Contract 
4. Consideration 
5. When Payment Due 
1 . Both debtors liable 
Both principal and 
surety 
AMF and Peritus both 
want Bailey to help 





AMF and Peritus 
Both liable to Bailey 












Horrocks check after 
Construction complete 
Only Accelerated Paving 
Horrocks - Gratuitous 
Accelerated - Construction 
SeNices 
Horrocks only pays after 
Accelerated default 
If guaranty valid -
Both Horrocks and 
Accelerated liable 
The original complaint filed by Bailey complied with Idaho's pleading rules. 
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Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading. 
(a) Claim for relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: 
(1) A short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's 
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim 
needs no new jurisdictional support; 
(2) A short and p!ain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief; and 
(3) A demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the 
alternative or different types of relief. 
* * * * 
(d)(3) Inconsistent claims or defenses. A party may state as many 
separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency. 
(e) Construing Pleadings. Pleadings must be construed so as to do 
justice. 
I.R.C.P. 8 (Emphasis added.) 
Section I of the original complaint is entitled "Parties, Jurisdiction, and Venue," 
contains eight separately numbered paragraphs and clearly complies with the 
requirement of a "short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction." 
Section II entitled "Background Facts" contains paragraphs 9 - 18 setting forth a 
chronology of the contractual dealings between Bailey, Peritus, AMF, and the 
individuals acting in their dual capacities for AMF and Peritus. (R. 000011 - 14.) 
Section Ill entitled "Count One" - "Breach of Employment Agreement" contains 
paragraphs 19 - 25 and correctly sets forth the 2006 "oral employment contract" and its 
breach. (See paragraphs 19 - 21.) (R. 000014.) Paragraphs 22 - 24 set forth a 
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breach of contract claim for the written contract dated August 10, 2011. (R. 000014 -
15.) The written employment contract was attached as an exhibit to the complaint and 
incorporated by reference by paragraph 15 in the general allegations. (R. 000019 - 20.) 
Rule 10. Form of Pleading. 
{b) Adoption by reference, Exhibits. A statement in a pleading may be 
adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other 
pleading or motion. A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to 
a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes. 
I.R.C.P. 10(c). (Emphasis added.) 
The complaint clearly apprised Peritus that it was being sued for breach of the 
written employment contract which it signed as well as the breach of the oral contract. 
Paragraph 10 of the complaint specifically alleges Bailey "began employment for AMF 
and Peritus April 1, 2006." (R. 000012.) 
The complaint also contains a prayer for relief requesting total contract damages 
of $129,549.75 plus severance benefits of $300,000.00, future lost income, interest on 
the liquidated sums pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104, as well as attorney fees. The 
complaint clearly complies with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In light of the Mickelson Construction decision, Bailey elected to follow the 
procedure recommended by the Supreme Court and specifically plead exceptions to the 
Statute of Frauds affirmative defense raised by Peritus. The proposed Amended 
Complaint attached to the Motion to Amend is very similar to the initial complaint, 
containing a Parties, Jurisdiction, and Venue Section I, Background Facts Section II, 
and prayer for relief. The new complaint has three counts. Count One is "Breach of 
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Oral Contract" and attaches a copy of an unsigned letter memorializing the contract 
2006. (R. 000240-41; 000348 - 49). The complaint clarified the claim for the 
breach of the 2006 contract is "abandoned" due to the change in circumstances that 
occurred subsequent to the initial complaint. 
Count Two for Breach of VVritten agreement is similar to the initial complaint but 
clarifies the factual basis supporting the exception to the Statute of Frauds as provided 
in I.C. § 9-506(2). (R. 000341-343.) Bailey believes the Amended Complaint is 
unnecessary under Idaho's Notice Pleading Rules. However, the Amended Complaint 
does fairly and accurately respond to the affirmative defense asserted by Peritus and 
clearly raises the Original Obligation/Main Purpose legal issues. In the event the Court 
requires a pleading in response to an affirmative defense raised in the Answer, the 
Court should allow Bailey's Motion to Amend to reach the merits of this dispute. 
Technical rules of pleading are not desirable and are a waste of resources. 
E. BOTH PERITUS AND AMF AGREED TO BE OBLIGATED TO BAILEY 
Bailey testified he quit in late July 2011 because he was not receiving payment of 
his salary. When Heller and Desmond requested he return to work, Bailey refused to 
return unless and until he received a written contract signed by Peritus in which Peritus 
was obligated to fund his salary. In response, Desmond and Heller sent Bailey the 
written contraci they signed which expressly references iheir capaciiy as officers of 
Peritus. (R. 000310, para. 23-24.) 
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Peritus asserts only an employer can be obligated to pay Bailey. However, 
cites no Idaho authority for their contention. Peritus cites no statues in support 
of that novel legal concept. Peritus does not contend the contract with Peritus is illegal 
or for some other reason void as a matter of law. 
The only authority cited by Peritus that Peritus cannot enter into a contract to be 
jointly liable to Bailey is a Texas Federal District Court case interpreting Maritime Law. 
In Jernigan v. Lay Barge Delta Five, 296 F. Supp. 127 (S.D. Tex. 1969), a marine diver 
attempted to hold the boat owners liable for wages when his employer refused to pay. 
This was not a contract claim. The diver claimed the boat owner was liable based on 
the Jones Act or the General Maritime Law. 
Plaintiffs proceed on the theory that they are seamen as that term is 
defined by law and therefore entitled to be paid their wages by the owner 
of the vessel. 
Jernigan v. Lay Barge Delta Five, 296 F. Sup. 127 at 127. 
The Court went on to rule the statutes did not make the vessel owner liable for 
wages. That case does not address the issue of whether an interested party like 
Peritus can agree to pay AMF's debts. In Idaho there is no law prohibiting the freedom 
to contract. 
F. AGENTS OF ENTITIES ORDINARILY SHOULD NOTE THE CAPACITY IN 
WHICH THEY SIGN 
Ordinarily, when an agent of a business entity signs on behalf of the entity only, 
the agent should sign their name and the capacity in which they sign. 
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LC.§ 30-1-120 Requirements for Documents - Extrinsic Facts. 
(7) The person executing the document shall sign it and state 
beneath or opposite his signature his name and the capacity in 
which he signs. The document may but need not contain a 
corporate seal, attestation, acknowledgement, or verification. I.C. § 
30-1-120. (Emphasis added.). 
The Idaho Entity Transactions Act .has an identical provision specifying how 
agents sign documents for a business entity. 
I.C. § 30-18-703 Requirements for Filing of Documents. 
(f) The document must state the name and capacity of the person 
that signed it. The document may contain a corporate seal, 
attestation, acknowledgment, or verification. I.C. § 30-18-703(f). 
Reading the statues above, it is clear that after an agent signs his signature, it is 
the practice in Idaho to then state the "capacity" in which the agent signed. In this case 
it is clear that Heller and Desmond signed as officers of Peritus and as Directors of 
AMF. 
G. PERITUS AND AMF BREACHED RELIEVING BAILEY OF DUTY TO GIVE 
NOTICE 
Peritus contends it has no duty to pay severance pay because Bailey quit without 
giving notice. However, Bailey quit because AMF/Peritus failed to pay Bailey's wages. 
Peritus owed Bailey $40,119.00 for payments missed between January 1, 2012, and 
March 20, 2013. Their material breach of contract relieved Bailey of his duty to give 
notice of termination. 
The more appropriate inquiry is whether Stravens' failure to perform in a 
workmanlike manner was a "material breach" of the contract If a breach 
of contract is material, the other party's performance is excused. 
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J. P. Stravens Planning Assocs. V. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 
928 P.2d 46 at 49 (Idaho App. 1996). 
m. 
CONCLUSION 
AMF was a start-up company in 2001 which was only generating $2,500.00 per 
month in revenue but had overhead expenses of about $40,000.00 per month. Peritus 
provided funds to AMF to pay AMF's debts. In 2011 Bailey quit working for AMF 
because his salary had not been paid. Bailey agreed to return to work only after Peritus 
signed a written contract obligating Peritus to pay. After 2012 Bailey's salary was not 
paid in full and Bailey terminated his employment. Bailey filed suit against AMF and 
Peritus for breach of the contract. 
The determination of whether the relationship between Bailey, Peritus, and AMF 
is a "guaranty" pursuant to I.C. § 9-505 which requires a complete written contract or a 
"surety" arrangement pursuant to I.C. § 9-506(2) which can be oral is dependent on 
objective criteria. The defining characteristic of a guaranty is that the third party obligor 
only pays after a default occurs. Under a surety relationship, the surety provides funds 
throughout the relationship. There is typically gratuitous or no consideration in a 
guaranty arrangement unlike a surety. There are usually separate contracts in a 
guaranty situation and typically only one contract in a surety. The objective criteria 
establish this was a surety relationship, not a guaranty. Judgment should be reversed 
and judgment entered in favor of Bailey for breach of contract against Peritus. 
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DATED this 18th day of January, 2017. 
JEFFREY J. HEPWORTH, P.A. 
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